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ABSTRACT
The 1995 Farm Bill debate proved different than many economists expected. It was overwhelmingly
budget-driven. Few early concerns about the role of government, efficiency, equity, competitiveness,
environment, rural development, and food were addressed. Economic analysis played a different
role than anticipated. Models of who and how farm policy is made proved misleading; the debate
circumvented the traditional process. Economic models were used more to perform budget account-
ing than substantive analysis. And their substantive analyses often failed to capture the attention of
policymakers. Hence, while a reformist economist’s dream, the bill leaves as many issues unanswered
as it addresses.
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The 1995 Farm Bill debate began with considerable
talk of change. A survey of government, industry,
and university concerns conducted for the Senate
Agriculture Committee in late 1994 showed wide-
spread interest in modifying the core commodity
components of the 1990 legislation, but little
agreement on the direction or magnitude of change.
This same theme surfaced at conferences held by
commodity organizations, farm bureaus, agribusi-
ness groups, and think tanks in 1994 and 1995. But
again, there was little consensus on the general
shape of future farm policy or on program details
beyond easing planting restrictions to take advan-
tage of an expanding export market.
Most of the proponents of change in farm policy
used similar reformist language, but advocated very
different alternatives—ranging all the way from
more direct government intervention to complete
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government withdrawaL While still a minority, a
centrist group emerged that favored reform-de-
fined as moving farm policy toward significantly
less government intervention and more market or-
ientation, but with a transition period and a residual
role for public institutions.
Many economists would like to think that this
reformist interest related to their analysis ques-
tioning farm policy from both a narrow sector-
performance perspective and a broader public pol-
icy perspective. Much of their modeling work
suggested that farm policy could be redesigned to
meet producer, taxpayer, and consumer interests at
less cost and greater benefit to the agricultural sec-
tor and the general economy.’
1The models in question included traditional economic
models—formal quantitative “micro” models that used
econometrics, mathematical programming, and computer
simulationtodescribefarmoperations,commoditymarkets,
and overall sector performance, as well as more “macro”
models that describe agriculture’sinteraction with the rest
of the economy.The analysis also drew on policy-makingO‘Brien:Economic Analysis of Public Policy 13
As the 1995–96 debate hopefully draws to a
close, the new farm bill is likely to be fundamen-
tally reformist-in appearance at least, the most re-
formist bill since the 1930s and far more reformist
than most observers would have guessed at the
start. Even a temporary extension of current legisla-
tion agreed on as an interim alternative would only
delay, rather than forestall, the centrists’ move to-
ward less government and more market in the day-
to-day operation of the sector.
But the debate ultimately has proven to be very
different than many economists had expected. The
debate has been overwhelmingly budget-driven,
Few of the reformers’ initial concerns about the
general role of government and sector-specific con-
cerns about efficiency and equity, competitiveness,
the environment, rural development, and food qual-
ity and safety have been addressed. And many pro-
gram details are being designed not so much to im-
prove sector performance as to ensure that farm
interests make the smallest cuts in government sup-
port possible while still meeting Senate and House
mandates for budget cuts and reformist labels.
The role that economic analysis played has also
proven very different than anticipated. Traditional
models of who and how farm policy is made proved
the most misleading. This latest round of farm
legislation is more a product of circumventing the
process than working through it. Players at either
end of the policy-making continuum dominated—
hardline production-agriculture interests at the one
end and budget cutters with little interest in agricul-
ture at the other. Many players—even those willing
to move well beyond the status quo—found them-
selves either excluded from the process or in a reac-
tive role debating program detail rather than setting
policy direction. This is particularly true of the pub-
iic interest groups concerned with food, environ-
ment, and rural development interests who had
looked to the 1995 debate to reinforce their ex-
panding role in shaping farm policy.
Moreover, the more formal economic models
have been more in demand to conduct budget ac-
models—less formal, more qualitative models that com-
bined political science and economics to describe how the
farm policy-making process works, the major players,and
theirrespectiveroles.
counting than the substantive analysis they were
originally designed to do, This reflects not only
what became the overriding importance of budget,
but analytic shortcomings as well. Many of the eco-
nomic analyses focused on aggregate commodity
supply, demand, price, income, and cost indicators
that left more substantive reform questions and
adjustment alternatives only partially explored.
Much of the analysis simply failed to capture and
hold the attention of policymakers concerned with
either the shorter term budget issues or the longer
term issues facing agriculture in the 21st century.
Hence, while economists had much to say dur-
ing the 1995 Farm Bill debate, few key policymak-
ers seemed to be listening. While in many ways an
economist’s dream, the farm bill being passed in
both houses—but yet to be agreed to by the Admin-
istration—is largely externally imposed and leaves
many issues to be resolved in future farm bill de-
bates. And many economists in both the govern-
ment and the university community will have dif-
ficulty explaining the large investments made in
economic modeling and analysis in the name of
shaping enlightened public agricultural policy.
Pressure for Policy Reform
A number of developments combined in 1995 to
raise the possibility of fundamental change in farm
policy. At the risk of oversimplification, these de-
velopments can be broken down into longer term
forces at work within the sector and more proxi-
mate developments in the general economy. Econo-
mists have played a major role in identifying them
and getting the debate started.
Reform Pressures Within Agriculture
By 1995, six decades of structural change had
made the farm programs established in the 1930s
and fine-tuned more than a dozen times in the in-
terim anachronistic. The sector bore little resem-
blance to the agricultural economy of the Depres-
sion and many, if not most, of the policy problems
of the 1930s had been resolved or were no longer
relevant.
The farm sector of the inter-war period and
much of the post-war period was largely synony-
mous with the rural economy and employed almost14 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1996
two-fifths of the population. Household incomes
in this farm/rural economy had plummeted with
the Depression, averaged about a third of nonfarm
household income, and were more variable both
during the year and from year-to-year. Family
farms-generally small, owner-operated units that
depended on family labor, owned land and machin-
ery, and limited borrowed capital—dominated the
sector. Concentration was minimal, both in the
sense that there were few large farms and most
farms produced at least some of the same key crops
and livestock products.
In this setting, boosting/stabilizing farm in-
comes was a critical component of a national eco-
nomic recovery/development strategy. And tying
farm income support to the prices of a few key
commodities and linking payments to production
was a simple, attractive vehicle for delivering assis-
tance. Tying support to a few key commodities that
were produced on a large number of farms ensured
that program benefits were not skewed to one re-
gion or group of producers, With the very large
overlap between landowners and farm operators, it
made little difference how much support was ulti-
mately captured by operators as income or by land-
owners as rents or higher asset values. Moreover,
linking price and income support to output eventu-
ally made supply management an option for min-
imizing costs in what was essentially a closed ag-
ricultural economy.
By 1995, “farm” was no longer synonymous
with “rural”; agriculture accounted for less than a
fifth of economic activity in the majority of rural
counties. Roughly 2% of the population was en-
gaged in agriculture. Agriculture was dominated
by the much larger corporate farm-generally a
capital- and technology-intensive operation that of-
ten rented more land than it owned and depended
heavily on hired labor and management expertise.
Average farm household incomes grew to exceed
nonfarm household incomes, but the distinction be-
came increasingly meaningless. Over half of all
farm operators reported off-farm jobs as their ma-
jor occupation and, on average, the source of two-
thirds of their household incomes.
Production was also much more specialized and
concentrated, with 2070 of operators producing
809t0of output. Over half of the farm sector was
involved in producing commodities that did not
qualify for support, either directly through income
supports (i.e., grains, cotton) or through price
supports (i.e., sugar, tobacco, peanuts, dairy).
Moreover, the agricultural economy was an open
economy; farm operators competed directly with
operators in other sectors of the economy for inputs
such as capital, They also competed directly with
producers in other agricultural sectors abroad; over
25% of agricultural production was exported and
the equivalent of 15% was imported.
In short, farm policy had shifted from being a
progressive transfer of income to the rural two-
fifths of the population to being a regressive trans-
fer to the less than 2% of the population who
happened to be involved in producing selected
commodities. The harshest critics saw farm pro-
grams as a vehicle for an increasingly small minor-
ity to extract excess rent from the rest of the econ-
omy. And if farm program benefits are largely
capitalized into asset values as critics contended,
much of this regressive transfer goes to absentee
landlords and corporations who own and lease out
farmland but are not otherwise involved in agri-
culture.
If lagging public recognition of this anachro-
nism had muffled earlier interest in reform, public
awareness increased sharply in the early 1990s.
Critical studies conducted in forums as varied as
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the
land grant universities, the Natural Resource De-
fense Council, and the American Enterprise Insti-
tute moved farm policy from the back-burner to the
center of the public policy reform debate,
External Pressures for Reform
Outside of agriculture, increased concern about the
budget deficit and the election of Republican ma-
jorities to both houses in 1994 strengthened pres-
sure for reform. Agricultural reform attracted atten-
tion even among Republicans who had traditionally
supported farm sector interests and depended on
farm support for their seats.
Farm program costs were high—particularly
given the few, geographically concentrated constit-
uents benefiting from the programs. In an era of
growing concern about government spending, the
concentration of farm program spending on large-
scale producers of selected commodities increased
pressure for reform.
Farm program costs were also variable; spend-O‘Brien: Economic Analysis of Public Policy 15
ing could swing widely from year to year and con-
found budget forecasters. Critics were quick to
point out that actual farm program costs for the last
five-year farm bill cycle proved to be $57.7 billion,
compared to the $40.7 billion projected during the
1990 debate. This led critics to see many farm pro-
grams as open-ended entitlements no different
from Social Security or Medicare-but with more
variation and a far smaller constituency. This con-
tributed to widening demand for reform.
Philosophically, agricultural policy was also
viewed as a particularly intrusive example of bad
public policy. Government involvement affected
day-to-day operations ranging from allocating re-
sources to marketing final products. In an era of
policy liberalization marked by GAIT and NAFTA
agreements, interventionist farm policy was viewed
by many as a dinosaur. Hence, the political impera-
tive to streamline government and to balance the
budget translated into added pressure to reform
farm policy.
Ironically, the 1995–96 market setting also
added to support for reform as the debate pro-
gressed. Rising commodity prices in mid- and late
1995 weakened the case for supports outside the
sector and led some within the sector to call for
change. Many called for less government interven-
tion that would not entail foregoing price and in-
come supports but that would free producers from
government regulation. The bullish commodity
market also meant that the Administration and Con-
gress could cut support in 1996, and possibly in
1997, with fewer political repercussions in farm-
dependent areas and with a sense that much of the
sector was in an unusually strong financial position
to weather the adjustment.
It is difficult to weigh the relative importance of
these internal and external pressures. But it is clear
that they worked in combination in 1995 to rule out
the traditional bipartisan defense of the farm policy
status quo by a small, tightly-knit core in the agri-
culture committees and to push the debate at least
initially toward the centrists’ reform agenda.
Reform Proposals
The early farm bill debate reflected this widespread
interest in change and an increasingly dominant re-
formist theme. Proposals were made by a number
of groups. Some were “partial” in that they looked
only at a particular program or issue. But many
were comprehensive in that they called for a com-
plete overhaul of the commodity, trade, conserva-
tion, rural development, food, and research compo-
nents of farm policy. Most of these comprehensive
proposals fell somewhere in the ball park outlined
by the debate in the Administration, the Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry,
and the House Agriculture Committee.
Administration Proposal
Initial consideration of farm policy reform within
the Administration dated to mid-1994 and origi-
nated with an internal Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) effort to identify general budget
savings across a wide range of government pro-
grams. The agricultural component of the in-house
OMB effort focused on the commodity and trade
programs and called for large-scale reform to save
$16 billion out of the $51.8 billion included in the
President’s February 1994 budget to fund farm pro-
grams (Commodity Credit Corporation support and
related activities, as well as Public Law 480) from
FY 1995 to FY 1999.
This first cut had been changed dramatically
by May 1995 when the Administration went on
record with the “Blue Book” proposal to stay the
gradualist course laid out in the expiring 1990
Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act
(FACTA). In the interim, a White House Task Force
including USDA had been formed and the Admin-
istration had been forced to compromise on several
fundamentals to win farm votes for passage of the
GATT Uruguay Round and the NAFTA agree-
ments.
Before reform got seriously underway, the Ad-
ministration had agreed to fund the Export En-
hancement Program (EEP) at the maximum and cut
domestic supports the minimum allowable under
the GATT and NAFTA agreements, as well as to
extend the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).
The Blue Book reflected these commitments and
kept the fundamentals of supply management in
place—the “coupling” link between production
and support, loan rates, target prices, deficiency
payments, and annual set-asides for the income-
supported commodities and import restrictions and
production or marketing quotas for the price-
supported commodities.16 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1996
This call for limited reduction in FY 1996-99
spending—an estimated $1,5 billion—and mar-
ginal reforms put the Administration squarely in fa-
vor of the status quo and ruled out reform leader-
ship. But even status quo proponents within the
Administration recognized that the Blue Book pro-
posal would continue government withdrawal. The
1990 act froze nominal target prices and effectively
reduced real supports at the 2–49Z0per year pace
of inflation. This, combined with nonpayment acres
and frozen program yields, forced producers to
look more and more to the open market in mak-
ing production and marketing decisions. The more
reformist-minded called for accelerated with-
drawal—picking up the pace provided for in the
1990 legislation. But there was little serious discus-
sion of reversing the 1990 direction or even slowing
the pace implied in the expiring 1990 legislation.
The Administration would revamp its proposal
as the debate progressed and looked to higher com-
modity prices and program refinements to generate
added savings. The Administration eventually
added adjustments in nonpayment acres, means
testing, and increased producer flexibility, and esti-
mated total savings at $4.2 from the $49.3 billion
cost of continuing FACTA for FY 1995–99 esti-
mated in February 1995,
Senate Committee Discussions
Initial discussion of reform in the Senate started in
late 1994 with a call for “fundamental change” by
Agriculture Committee Chairman Lugar. He an-
nounced his intention in early December, shortly
after becoming chairman, to keep much of the tra-
ditional support structure in place but to make the
programs largely moot by the end of a five-year
transition period. He committed to at least four
principles: (a) eliminating annual acreage pro-
grams and increasing planting flexibility to free up
agriculture’s production potential, (b) reducing sup-
port levels to push the sector toward more market-
based decision making, (c) treating the price- and
income-supported commodities the same to ensure
equity, and (d) ensuring real budget savings by cap-
ping outlays.
Senator Lugar called for a 370 annual reduction
in the nominal target prices underpinning income
supports compared to the constant nominal target
prices built into the 1990 legislation and the Ad-
ministration’s proposal. This would eventually
make supports irrelevant nine years out of 1O—
possibly well before the end of the transition pe-
riod. This would double the pace of government
withdrawal, but leave a minimum safety net in
place at the end of the transition. The EEP program
was to be abolished immediately and the CRP pro-
gram was to be scaled back. Sugar, tobacco, and
peanut programs were also to be reformed by liber-
alizing quotas and lowering price support levels
enough to effectively eliminate the programs over
the same period. This Lugar proposal would save
$15 billion from the Congressional Budget Office’s
(CBO’S) early 1995 estimate of $41.6 billion for
continuing current legislation over the FY 1996 to
FY 2000 period.
Senator Lugar’s proposal proved to be more rad-
ical than the rest of the committee could support,
regardless of party lines. The committee would
eventually consider several other alternatives. Most
of them focused on slower-paced change couched
in reformist language. They included Senator
Cochran’s Agricultural Competitiveness Act and the
Farm Security Act introduced by a coalition of
Democratic senators. While many members of the
Senate and House continued to talk of reform, Sen-
ator Lugar’s proposal stood out as advocating the
most change despite its use of traditional program
language and the absence of reformist labels.
The Senate Agriculture Committee’s decision to
allocate more than half of the savings called for by
the Senate Budget Committee in the programs un-
der its purview to cuts in food programs reflected
this same concern about “undercutting agriculture
with a precipitous withdrawal of support.” But a
committee majority was unable to support any of
the alternative proposals and remained deadlocked.
Leadership in the congressional debate eventually
passed to the House, where general reformist pres-
sures proved stronger.
House Committee Discussions
Debate in the House Agriculture Committee fo-
cused initially on rejecting the Lugar proposal as
too radical for a majority of even Republican mem-
bers to support, However, most committee mem-
bers also recognized that a status quo proposalO’Brien: Economic Analysis of Public Policy 17
would not win support from the Budget Committee,
the Speaker, or the full House.
Ultimately, Chairman Roberts introduced a
Freedom to Farm Bill that provided for the appear-
ance of dramatic reform by eliminating the price
and income support and the supply management
programs, Roberts’ proposal essentially took
House leadership’s mandate to find $13 billion in
savings from the $44 billion that the CBO esti-
mated current legislation would cost for FY 1996–
2002 as given, and “got the best possible deal for
agriculture.”
The bill provided for decoupling, flexibility,
and guaranteed budget savings. Freedom to Farm
would decouple farm programs by breaking the link
between production and payments as well as the
link between prices and payments. It proposed end-
ing acreage programs and provided full producer
flexibility in making land use and production deci-
sions. It also guaranteed spending would not move
above—or drop below—the spending targets im-
plied by applying the Budget Committee’s man-
dated savings to the CBO’S February 1995 esti-
mates of the cost of continuing the current program.
It did so by providing for capped annual transition
payments to producers eligible for support.
The CRP and EEP programs were maintained,
but with less funding and a modified mandate de-
signed to provide farmers with more acreage man-
agement options and to keep export program
spending well below the Uruguay cap. Much
slower-paced changes were designated for the
price-supported commodities.
As the year progressed and the market environ-
ment improved, it became clear that Freedom to
Farm conceded little and gained much for tradi-
tional production-agriculture interests, possibly
more than a continuation of current legislation,
Commodity prices had risen sharply by the fall of
1995; with prices up, many producers faced having
to repay $1.7 billion in advanced 1995 deficiency
payments as well as foregoing the deficiency pay-
ments projected under current legislation for their
1996 and 1997 crops, Incorporating the fall’s higher
commodity prices into the CBO’S current legisla-
tion baseline would have lowered projected farm
program costs $8 billion.
Crediting this $8 billion in “savings” to farm
program reform would mean that two-thirds of the
cuts called for by the Budget Committee had al-
ready been realized. Not crediting this savings to
reform would have meant even more draconian
change, since the original $13 billion in savings
would have to be extracted from a $36 billion pot
rather than a $44 billion pot.
In this fall setting, Roberts’ proposal would de-
liver reformist language and guaranteed savings—
but in return for locking in the higher spring spend-
ing target ($44 billion minus $13 billion, rather
than $36 billion minus $13 billion). This would es-
sentially “capture the baseline” and afford the sec-
tor roughly as much taxpayer support-possibly
more when added commodity prices gains over
November–January are taken into account—than
under a continuation of current programs.
Several other House initiatives were advanced,
but with more emphasis on reform than in the Sen-
ate. The Farm Freedom Act introduced by Repre-
sentative Zimmer called for the strongest reforms
and would have saved approximately $29 billion in
a six-year phaseout of programs. Representative
Emerson introduced the equivalent of Senator
Cochran’s Agricultural Competitiveness Act which
called for far slower paced reforms. But the House
Agriculture Committee remained deadlocked and
was unable to report out a bill.
What happened at this point is unclear. Either
Chairman Roberts appealed to House leadership
and won their agreement to threaten to write their
own farm bill in the Budget Committee or on the
floor if the Agriculture Committee failed to agree
on “sweeping reforms.” Or House leadership inter-
vened on their own behalf and threatened Chairman
Roberts with Budget Committee writing of the
farm bill if he failed to get a reformist proposal
agreed on and read out of the committee. In either
case, Chairman Roberts had the leverage he
needed. He used a provision included in the Budget
Act of 1974 that allowed him to bypass his fellow
committee members “if a committee . . . failed to
submit recommended changes to its Committee on
the Budget pursuant to its instructions.” And the
Freedom to Farm Bill moved forward to the full
House without majority support in the committee.
Without similar reformist pressure from their
Budget Committee and leadership, the Senate Agri-
culture Committee deadlock ended with Senator
Cochran’s more traditionalist proposal winning ma-18 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1996
jority support. Cochran’s Agricultural Competitive-
ness Act was reported out of committee to the full
Senate. This forced Senate and House leadership
into a conference dominated by their respective
budget committees’ drive for savings and their agri-
culture committees’ interest in reformist labels that
left as much support for the sector in place as pos-
sible.
Conference Resolution
The Senate and House ultimately resolved their
differences in November 1995, with conference
agreement on the Agricultural Reconciliation Act
(ARA). The ARA draws heavily on the Freedom to
Farm Bill, but leaves many issues for future resolu-
tion—either in a “Farm Bill II” later in 1996 or in
what could become annual farm bills or reconcilia-
tion legislation. These unsettled items range from
commodity program specifics (such as dairy sup-
ports) to broader issues (such as the agricultural re-
search and conservation titles).
While at first reading ARA is the most reformist
of the major proposals, critics contend that it uses
Roberts’ spending language to “capture the base-
line.” The ARA would save $12.3 billion from the
CBO’S February 1995 baseline projection of $56.6
billion for the next five years, but only $4.5 billion
from the December 1995 CBO baseline. The con-




Repealing permanent legislation—the 1938 Ag-
ricultural Adjustment Act and the 1949 Agricul-
tural Act. This frees up future farm policy debates
from the threat of policy defaulting to even more
outdated programs, such as parity pricing.
Breaking the link (decoupling) between farm
production and income support as well as income
support and commodity prices. Income support
over a seven-year transition period is to be based
on “transition payments” calculated independent
of current production levels and market prices.
These transition payments over the 1996-2002
period essentially “buy out” farm interests in
longstanding support programs that are abolished
with the start of the 1996 crop years.
Eliminating supply management and increasing
planting flexibility by abolishing annual acreage





to withdraw from the CRP. Market prices, rather
than ARPs and target prices, drive resource allo-
cation and marketing decisions.
Shifting the risk-management burden from tax-
payers toward producers. Ups and downs in the
commodity markets have no effect on transition
payments; crop insurance, as opposed to conser-
vation cross-compliance, becomes optional. A
modified loan program is kept to provide a mini-
mum safety net, but with provisions to ensure that
loan rates are well below market prices. The
Farmer-Owned Reserve is also abolished.
Capping transition payments over the 1996–2002
period at no more or less than $35 billion, with
annual caps declining to $4.5 billion in 2002. But
what happens to payments in 2003 and beyond is
not specified. Transition payments are limited to
$40,000 per person, but the three-entity rule is
left in place.
Limiting changes in production/marketing quotas
and import restrictions for sugar, tobacco, and
peanuts, and ensuring that they are operated as
“no net-cost” programs.
Capping the CRP at 36.4 million acres and EEP
expenditures at $1 billion less than the maximum
provided in the Uruguay Agreement and commit-
ted to by the Administration.
This ARA language was sent to the President
but was vetoed as part of a larger package of deficit-
reducing legislation, At least two outcomes are pos-
sible at this time. Current law could be extended for
one year or longer to ensure that programs are in
place to meet the Secretary’s mid-February dead-
line linked to announcing 1996 programs, Or the
Administration and Congress could agree on ARA
changes that make it acceptable to both parties. But
given the tenuous nature of the ARA compromise
within Congress, large-scale changes seem un-
likely to win support in both houses. While much
less probable, the debate could break down alto-
gether and lead to a reversion to the permanent leg-
islation included in the 1938 and 1949 agricultural
acts.
Analytic Support for Reform
All of the comprehensive reform proposals drew on
a bevy of agricultural economists and model resultsO‘Brien: Economic Analysis of Public Policy
to support their initiatives. While details differed
and differences were emphasized, these analyses
pointed to many of the same basic conclusions
about the operation of the sector and the impact of
reform.
The tools used included several large-scale
modeling systems and teams of analysts including:
l The USDA’s system of “micro” and “macro”
.
.
models, subject specialists, and interagency com-
mittees used to produce the current legislation
baseline and assess the impact of alternative re-
form scenarios for a largely Executive Branch
clientele. The USDA’s analysis generally empha-
sized farm operator-level analysis and sector-
level performance measures such as commodity
supply, demand, and prices; farm income and fi-
nance; food supplies and prices; budget costs;
and resource use. Much of this analysis was done
using the Food and Agricultural Policy Simula-
tion Model (FAPSIM), the Farm Cost and Re-
turns Survey System (FCRS), the U.S. Comput-
able General Equilibrium Model (USCGE),
country projections and policy analysis (CPPA)
models, and smaller individual commodity and
resource models.
The CBO’S system of staff experts, commodity
spreadsheets, and more detailed budget models
for the price- and income-supported commodities
and the conservation and trade programs. The
CBO generated a current legislation baseline and
analyzed the major Senate and House alternatives
for a largely Legislative Branch clientele. While
less comprehensive than the USDA analysis, the
CBO’S evaluation proved critical initially in set-
ting budget savings targets and later in the debate
when both Congress and the Administration
agreed to use CBO estimates as the basis for bud-
get arithmetic.
The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Insti-
tute (FAPRI) system of staff experts and linked
commodity and farm models housed at the Uni-
versity of Missouri, Iowa State University, and
Texas A&M University. The FAPRI system pro-
vided a range of analyses roughly comparable to
that of the USDA for Legislative Branch clients
and the general public. The FAPRI system pro-
duced a current legislation baseline and assessed
alternative reform scenarios, with the analysis
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focusing on national supply, demand, price, in-
come, and cost analysis, and including represen-
tative farm results,
c The Policy Simulation Model (POLYSIM) sys-
tem built and operated by a consortium of schools
including the University of Tennessee and Okla-
homa State University. The POLYSIM system de-
pended more heavily on a formal large-scale
model and less on staff expertise because of the
limited personnel associated with the initiative.
However, the system provided some of the most
detailed modeling of supply response and in-
cluded regional detail.
Several other “analytic frameworks” were used
to develop and evaluate farm bill proposals. The
Heritage Foundation study and World Resource In-
stitute studies of conservation issues, for example,
all drew heavily on their own models of the agricul-
tural sector. The tools used also included more de-
tailed single-commodity models and specialized
models focusing on resource use and land values.
In short, few policy discussions have ever started
with as impressive an array of tools and as many
practitioners committed to the debate.
Common Conclusions
While their results were often interpreted and de-
scribed very differently, these modeling systems
pointed to several common conclusions.
l The analyses projected little change in the pro-
duction of the major commodities under the re- ‘
form scenarios. Market prices and domestic and
foreign demand also changed little with reform.
This was particularly true for the half of the
sector that has not received support. However, it
also proved true of the major income-supported
commodities and, to a lesser extent, the price-
supported commodities.
The analyses indicate that there would be
little added acreage (possibly less) planted to
grains, oilseeds, and cotton with reform, This
suggests that much of the land idled at taxpayer
expense would not come back into production
even with planting restrictions eliminated, This
contradicts conventional wisdom that farmers pay




limiting plantings and boosting prices in response
to the USDA’s supply management directives.
Acreage and production of the price-supported
commodities change more, but not to the extent
many analysts expected with liberalization or
elimination of quotas.
The models suggested that farm income would
fall below baseline levels projected with a contin-
uation of current legislation in the short and me-
dium term of five-seven years, with the reduction
concentrated in the supported commodities. The
incomes of program commodity producers would
fall almost dollar-for-dollar with the drop in gov-
ernment payments for grains and cotton, and with
reductions in price supports for tobacco, peanuts,
and sugar.
While few of the studies drew the conclusion
explicitly, this combination of supply, demand,
price, and income outcomes lends credibility to
critics’ claims that government transfers through
the farm programs are excess rents that have little
to do with what the sector contributes to the gen-
eral economy.
For the longer term, analyses suggested that re-
form would spark structural change that would
push income back up toward baseline levels by
the end of a five- to seven-year transition period.
Several factors are at work. Virtually all of the
analyses suggested that many of the benefits of
the income and price support programs have been
capitalized into asset values—particularly land
values. With support withdrawn, asset values
would be substantially lower than with current
legislation continued and income payments tied
to the land. In most of the analyses, land values
fell in real terms, and in several cases in nominal
terms as well. In turn, this would work to lower
production costs and boost returns, since market
prices would change little between scenarios.
While not generally highlighted, this suggests
that much of the adjustment burden associated
with reform would be borne by landowners who
leased out over two-fifths of the acreage in field
crop production and an even higher share of acre-
age in crops such as peanuts, tobacco, and wheat.
Analyses also suggested that adjustment burdens
would be unevenly distributed geographically if
serious reform of the nature proposed by Senator
Lugar were undertaken. Reform impact would
depend heavily on commodity concentration, size
and type of farm, location, on-farm adjustment
options, and off-farm employment opportunities.
Smaller regions that heavily depend on tobacco,
peanuts, sugar, and rice, and larger regions that
depend on wheat would feel the most impact. The
.
l
impact of reform would be particularly pro-
nounced, for example, in the Northern Great
Plains, Reductions in the EEP and changes in the
size and nature of the CRP would exacerbate the
income drop associated with lower price and in-
come supports, Moreover, alternatives for cutting
costs or changing commodity concentration to re-
coup income losses are very limited, along with
off-farm employment opportunities.
While generally not emphasized, this skew re-
inforces reformist claims that the current program
weakens and distorts the agricultural economy by
undermining the natural comparative advantage
of regions such as the Corn Belt and by creating
costly, artificial policy-based advantages in areas
such as the Northern Great Plains.
While not all of the modeling systems had the ca-
pacity to gauge it, results also suggested that the
impact of farm program reform would be sub-
stantially smaller if done as part of a broader
effort to balance the budget. CBO and USDA
analyses demonstrated that a balanced budget’s
impact on interest rates, inflation, and income
growth in the general economy would offset
much (eventually all) of the impact of reform on
the farm sector. Income growth boosts demand,
while lower interest rates and slower inflation
work to keep down production costs. Moreover,
lower interest rates and inflation, combined with
lower production costs, increase U.S. competi-
tiveness and foreign demand for farm products.
In this setting, the sector fared as well several
years into reform as under the baseline, provided
that the broader effort to balance the budget was
successful.
While treatment was less detailed, analyses sug-
gested that support is very uneven across com-
modities. The price-supported commodities gen-
erally are afforded more favorable treatment than
the income-supported commodities. And rice and
cotton are generally afforded more supportO‘Brien: Economic Analysis of Public Policy 21
under current programs than the other income-
supported commodities. Hence, while reforming
the price support programs does little to help the
budget, and reforming rice and cotton programs
could prove politically difficult, both are critical
in an equity sense and from a market efficiency
perspective.
l While incomplete at best, the analysis incorporat-
ing year-to-year fluctuation in yields and exports
emphasized that reform amounts to the realloca-
tion of risk. The traditional programs shared
downside risk between farm producers and soci-
ety by underwriting prices and incomes in bearish
markets, but allocated all of the upside risk to
producers to be captured through higher prices
and incomes in bullish markets. The slower-
paced reform proposals lowered the safety net
and transferred much of the downside risks that
had been borne by the taxpayer back to the pro-
ducer. Proposals eliminating farm programs
essentially transferred all of the downside risks
associated with swings in commodity supply, de-
mand, and prices back to producers.
Growing Irrelevance of Economic Analysis
Despite the considerable analysis underlying early
reform proposals, both farm policy-making models
and economic models grew less relevant as the de-
bate progressed.
Remaking the Making of Farm Policy
The farm policy-making process and the mix of
actors shaping it have been very different so far in
the 1995 debate than past experience would have
suggested. This worked to ensure budget savings
and the inclusion of reformist language in the bill.
But it also increases the probability of an early re-
newal of the debate. With any weakening in pres-
sure on the budget, actors and issues lost in the
shuffle are likely to resurface.
The farm policy-making cycle traditionally
started with informal debate in a small circle of
commodity groups, farm operators, agribusinesses,
and other public interest groups 12–18 months be-
fore existing legislation expires. The Administra-
tion has typically drawn on this debate and its own
experience in operating farm programs to develop
a sense of how current law has performed and what
modifications would improve operation over the
next four- year round. While the USDA plays a lead
role in developing this perspective, it also reflects
broader Executive Branch concerns. This package
essentially serves as the Administration’s “mark”
when formal debate begins in Congress.
Several forces worked in 1995 to downplay the
role of this Administration mark. There were con-
flicting demands for attention within the Executive
Branch and differences in opinion about policy di-
rection across agencies and within the USDA itself.
Most important, however, the Republican majori-
ties in both houses emphasized their leadership role
and commitment to more far-reaching changes than
suggested in the Blue Book.
The actual writing of legislation typically starts
with Senate and House Agriculture Committee
hearings. Initial hearings generally focus on overall
policy performance, but the agenda quickly moves
to title-specific sessions designed to provide the
committees with a forum to elicit commentisupport
for specific changes in the legislation. The commit-
tees’ legislative drafting sessions provide yet an-
other opportunity for debate with representatives
from the Administration in attendance.
Several checks and balances work to keep agri-
culture committee members from focusing too nar-
rowly on sector interests. The committees’ pro-
posals must be approved by a majority of their
members, the full Senate or House, possibly a con-
ference committee, and ultimately the President. If
the committees manage the process effectively,
their farm bills go for a floor vote on a closed rule,
But too parochial a package could face filibustering
or an amendment fight, a negative floor vote, or
presidential veto.
The year’s congressional debate short-circuited
much of this process. The committees minimized
investment in hearings—particularly title-specific
hearings-as well as legislative drafting sessions.
Early debate included wide-ranging discussion of
broad reform options and policy objectives. But
once farm spending cuts were decided on in the
budget committees and endorsed by Senate and
House leadership, committee debate shifted to
drafting policies—particularly commodity poli-
cies—to meet reduction goals. The committees
were unable to agree even with this narrowing of
the agenda, Senator Cochran’s Agriculture Compet-22
itiveness Act was narrowly approved over Senator
Lugar’s objections. And the Freedom to Farm pro-
posal was finally placed in the House Reconcilia-
tion Bill without Agriculture Committee approval
through Chairman Roberts’ appeals to the House
leadership.
Moreover, the larger Reconciliation Bill, of
which Freedom to Farm was a part, was considered
on the floor under special rules that prohibited
amendments and filibustering. And the final pack-
age went as part of the larger deficit reduction pack-
age approved in both houses and sent to the Pres-
ident.
This short-circuiting minimized substantive dis-
cussion and strengthened the role of two interest
groups—traditional agricultural interests able to
deadlock the committees, and budget interests able
to force spending cuts through as part of the recon-
ciliation legislation. This left many other public in-
terest groups with less of a role in policy making
than expected. While these “other interests” have
had a difficult time wading into previous farm bill
debates, many looked for the 1995 debate to be
more inclusive.
This short-circuiting also reflected more than
the strength of these two interest groups. Many of
the other public interest groups thought likely to
play a major role in the 1995 debate proved unable
to attract and hold the interest of key policy makers.
Environmental groups, for example, proved less
powerful than many expected in the 12–18 months
immediately preceding the debate, While work
done by the Environmental Working Group, World
Resources Institute, and the Natural Resources De-
fense Council contributed early onto strengthening
demand for reform, debates about the CRP focused
largely on budget cost—and the ARA is silent on
key conservation provisions over and above the
livestock initiative.
Food groups also recognized with greater clar-
ity that their interests were increasingly at odds
with traditional farm groups, but failed to stop a
disproportionately large cut in food programs in the
Senate. Many rural development interests also rec-
ognized with increased clarity that the presumed
“common interest” that traditionally bound them
to farm groups no longer applied; farm and rural
interests found themselves competing for the same
scarce dollars, and with increasingly adversarial
rather than complementary interests.
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Hence, the traditional policy-making model
missed the mark both in suggesting where the ulti-
mate decisions would be made and which actors
would shape them. And while the aberrations in the
process at work over the last four–six months may
have been necessary to break the deadlock, the pro-
cess bypassed actors and issues likely to resurface
with any weakening in commitment to deficit re-
duction in the budget committees or among Senate
and House leadership.
Shortcomings of Economic Models
Economic models and analyses also proved less
helpful than anticipated as the debate progressed.
Many of the models moved from being the substan-
tive focus for debate to being accounting frame-
works for estimating budget impacts. This repre-
sented a double failure. On the one hand, few of
the models in question were well suited to estimat-
ing budget impacts—particularly the range of bud-
get costs possible in very different market situa-
tions.
But this shift also reflected the analysts’ inabil-
ity to capture and hold the attention of policy mak-
ers on key substantive issues. The models logically
were built using historical data and focused on sim-
ilar commodity supply, demand, prices, income,
and cost variables. These characteristics limited
their applicability in evaluating the more radical
reform scenarios and in addressing many of the
efficiency, equity, environment, rural development,
food safety and quality, and research questions un-
derlying the drive for reform.
Much of the analysis that was performed did
little, even before the debate shifted to budget ac-




the tradeoffs between efficiency and equity
within the agricultural sector, the linkage be-
tween the agricultural sector and the general
economy, and the relationship between U.S. and
foreign agriculture;
the tradeoff between reducing support for the
sector and increasing natural resource steward-
ship, as well as between environmental concerns
and efficiency and private resource ownership;
risk management—whether stated broadly in




tains to stabilize potentially volatile commodity
markets at whose cost, or stated more narrowly
in terms of producer and taxpayer sharing of the
income impact of swings in yields and prices;
the role of agricultural research and who ulti-
mately gains and loses with the accelerated devel-
opment and dissemination of new technology;
other reform options designed to meet both bud-
get goals and sector policy needs—such as reve-
nue assurance and insurance programs, and in-
come stabilization plans; and
the national and regional adjustment burdens as-
sociated with reform and alternatives to facilitate
adjustment while minimizing costs to taxpayers,
producers, consumers, and farm communities.
For example, despite the considerable analytic
capacity available, ARA’s transition payments are
based on the maximum funding available after
meeting savings mandates, rather than any assess-
ment of sector adjustment needs.
Even had these models and economists interpre-
ting them been able to address the more substantive
issues, it is unclear what difference they would have
made. Insistence in both houses that the farm bill
meet budget targets and carry a reform label over-
shadowed all other considerations before the debate
had proceeded far—and made Roberts, rather than
Lugar, the more important policymaker,
Budget-Driven Reform
In the final round, the new farm bill is likely to be a
reform landmark that moves the sector further away
from government intervention toward more open-
market operations. From an economist’s perspec-
tive, this will eliminate a distortionist set of policies
that misallocates resources, weakens both sector-
and economy-wide performance, and transfers in-
come and wealth regressively. It will also allow for
a transition that should reduce adjustment costs,
compensate losers, and leave society a net gainer
even after transition costs are accounted for.
But these reform results are based on budget
pressure and a unique political setting in the Senate
and House rather than on a more substantive evalu-
ation of the sector’s policy needs and the general
economy’s interests in farm policy. In many cases,
the reforms are likely to prove more apparent than
real. Many of the basic questions that seemed likely
to dominate discussion early in the debate and lead
to reform will simply have to wait for future farm
bill debates—hopefully more substantive debates
in which budget concerns can play a less dominant
role.